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It would force individual Indians to form part of a community they had not chosen, and deny them rights to subsistence should they opt to leave. 'This would be an aplanadora (steamroller) law, because it would assume what people want without even asking them, without giving them a choice.' She defended the principles of individual freedom and choice with a fervent conviction that carried not a hint of bureaucratic cynicism, evoking the sensibilities of the nineteenth century liberal struggles against privilege and corruption of the Church and aristocracy. The interview created a vivid image of pitched battle between proponents of incompatible principles: neoliberal modernisation on the one hand and indigenous cultural rights on the other.
Yet behind this first image is another, without which the anecdote would be seriously misleading. Much of the vehemence and urgency behind our economist's spirited rhetoric came not from confrontations with indigenous communities or even 'multiculturalist' NGOs, but rather from sparring with colleagues working in other departments within the World Bank itself. Her adversaries had been empowered by recently approved internal Bank reforms that mandated respect for indigenous rights (including communal land tenure) and 'informed indigenous participation' in projects like the one she was trying to manage. These reforms, and similar ones in the IDB and other sister organisations, resulted in part from a felicitous alliance of progressive insiders and NGOs that exerted pressure from the outside.4 However, the strength and ubiquity of a 'cultural rights' agenda among a whole array of institutions (from multi-lateral banks to bi-lateral aid programmes) constitutionally committed to the principles of global neoliberal governance brings the internal conflicts pointedly to the fore. Viewed close up, there appear to be extraordinary numbers of'progressives', some with years of experience fighting the good fight from the 'outside', who now have turned to struggles from within. From a distance, however, also in evidence are a wave of precautionary and pre-emptive reforms, actions taken to cede carefully chosen ground in order to more effectively fend off more farreaching demands, and even more important, to pro-actively shape the terrain on which future negotiations of cultural rights take place. To focus on neoliberal multiculturalism, in short, is to call for critical examination of how this impressive array of pro-indigenous reforms have been achieved, and even more urgently, to ask: what do these reforms do?
This question calls for a multi-levelled analysis that exceeds the reach of a single essay. Powerful institutions that operate outside the bounds of a single nation-state play a crucial role in the process, both as proponents of neoliberal multiculturalism in their own programmes and policies, and as sources of nearly irresistible influence on the others. The state also must figure prominently, both as the site where most achievements of cultural rights are formally registered, and as primary source of the preemptive strike against more expansive expressions of those rights. Private sector power holders, especially owners of capital, enter directly in the equation as well, as weighty actors in their own right, and influences on political decision-makers. A final group of dominant actors, often neglected in such analysis, is the provincial elite: people of the dominant culture who interact daily with indigenous people and who are apt to experience most directly any challenge to prevailing relations of inequality and subordination. When this essay turns ethnographic, it will focus on one such group of provincial elites -Ladinos in highland Guatemala -and will attempt to register the other levels of analysis as mediated through these Ladinos' political discourse and practice. In so doing, I do not mean to present provincial elites as the privileged site of analysis, but rather, to suggest that one should be able to break into the global-national-local web of relations at any point, and proceed from there. The key criterion is that the analysis have ethnographic depth, with ambition not for comprehensive scope (with the attendant risk of turning abstract and ungrounded), but for theoretically informed particularity.5
In a time when official discourse in Guatemala has shifted perceptiblyif at times reluctantly -toward recognition of Maya culture and endorsement of multicultural ideals, the scepticism of middle-class Ladinos in the highland department Chimaltenango remains closer to the surface. When these Ladinos talk about the rising presence and voice of the Maya majority, they invariably make an association with new policies of the state and especially, the international support for human rights and multiculturalism; most express deep anxiety about the consequences that could follow. The most alarmist conjure up images of ethnic cleansing; many worry that once in power, Mayas could voltear la tortilla (literally 'flip over the tortilla', read here as meaning to reverse existing power imbalances). Yet implicit even in this metaphoric warning lies an equally characteristic acknowledgement of past injustice, an admission that not so long ago Ladinos had oppressed Indians. With the exception of a few extremists (mainly from the older generation), these Ladinos now generally criticise the racism of times past, believe that indigenous culture should be respected, and that a principle of equality regardless of cultural difference ought to prevail. In other words, even those with most to lose endorse some facets of multiculturalism, so long as it does not go too far.
This last qualification highlights my central argument. Neoliberal multiculturalism has come about in part as a response to demands for rights by the culturally oppressed and excluded. In this sense it opens new political space, offers significant concessions, which in a previous moment would have remained clearly beyond reach. Specifically, proponents of neoliberal multiculturalism are most apt to embrace the rights of 'recognition', categorically denied or suppressed because notions of citizenship, nation-building and societal development were predicated on the image of a culturally homogeneous political subject.6 From 'recognition' other rights logically follow, justified in the spirit of intercultural equality: reforms in language and educational policy, antidiscrimination legislation, devolution of responsibility for governance to local institutions, measures to end indigenous peoples' political exclusion. Yet these initiatives also come with clearly articulated limits, attempts to distinguish those rights that are acceptable from those that are not. Even more important, the concessions and prohibitions of neoliberal multiculturalism structure the spaces that cultural rights activists occupy: defining the language of contention; stating which rights are legitimate, and what forms of political action are appropriate for achieving them; and even, weighing in on basic questions of what it means to be indigenous. Or, to return to the chimaltecos' straightforward admonition: Mayas are made to know when they are going too far.
This essay is divided into three sections, each of which takes a discrete question as a point of departure: What is neoliberal multiculturalism? How has it come into being? What does it do? The first section suggests how we might think about a package of rights that both constitute newly opened political space and 'discipline' those who occupy that space. The second section offers an account of the shift from the cultural project of homogeneous citizenship, to the ethic of neoliberal multiculturalism, with an emphasis on Central America. This shift generally includes a progressive gesture of 'recognition', and an advancement of indigenous cultural rights, as was the case with the preceding official discourse of Does Multiculturalism Menace? 49 I mestiZaje. Multiculturalism, I contend, is the mestizaje discourse for new millennium, offering a parallel mix of opportunity and peril. In a final section I offer a close reading of cultural politics in one locale, with an emphasis on Ladino discourse and practice. I pay attention not only to instrumental manoeuvres, explicitly intended to constrain more expansive Maya demands, but also, to the conjuncture of forces -global, national and local -which together produce effects that reach well beyond anyone's intention or design. In this last section and throughout, I concentrate on the forces at work in shaping Maya subjectivities, but devote scant attention to the expression of these subjectivities themselves. This methodological decision has a dual rationale, best made explicit from the start. I designed my ethnographic research with the goal of elucidating the structures of power that stand as the Maya cultural rights movement's most immediate impediments, in hopes of producing knowledge that its leaders would find useful. By the same token, I avoided subjecting Maya actors themselves to sustained ethnographic scrutiny, on the assumption that they have been 'anthropologised' enough by others. This research design does generate an obvious disadvantage with regard to the central argument here: I cannot fully substantiate the assertion that neoliberal multiculturalism has served to re-constitute Maya political subjectivities. This in turn leaves the essay with a more modest purpose: to convince the reader that one version of multiculturalism -almost certainly its dominant form in Guatemala and Central America -carries considerable potential for menace. Specifically, powerful political and economic actors use neoliberal multiculturalism to affirm cultural difference, while retaining the prerogative to discern between cultural rights consistent with the ideal of liberal, democratic pluralism, and cultural rights inimical to that ideal. In so doing, they advance a universalist ethic which constitutes a defence of the neoliberal capitalist order itself. Those who might challenge the underlying inequities of neoliberal capitalism as part of their 'cultural rights' activism are designated as 'radicals', defined not as 'anti-capitalist' but as 'culturally intolerant, extremist'. In the name of fending off this 'ethnic extremism', powerful actors relegate the most potent challenges to the existing order to the margins, and deepen divisions among different strands of cultural rights activism, all the while affirming (indeed actively promoting) the principle of rights grounded in cultural difference. By advancing this critique, I hope to encourage thinking about strategies to take advantage of the spaces opened by neoliberal reforms, without falling victim to these dangers. The idea that such analysis might prove useful to indigenous cultural rights activists, in Guatemala and elsewhere, must for the purposes of this essay remain an unconfirmed assertion.
II. What is neoliberal multiculturalism?
'The neoliberal project is not only about economic policies or state reform but includes policies of social adjustment informed by a cultural project. Social adjustment became an increasingly important item on the agenda and goes together with a transformation of the role of civil society and a new discourse on citizenship.' -Assies et al., The Challenge of Diversity.7
The state-endorsed discourse of 'multiculturalism' in Latin America has an ostensibly straightforward message that raises a host of complex legal and political questions. Minimally, this message entails recognition of cultural difference, in the sense of the now ubiquitous official affirmations that, 'we are a multi-ethnic, pluri-lingual society'. The contrast between such affirmations and the previous inclination toward outright erasure is stark, and recognition alone can open space and spark political repercussions well beyond its own stated intentions. Yet such affirmations are filled with ambiguity regarding the specific collective rights that follow from recognition, the mechanisms required to guarantee full enjoyment of these rights, and the relationship between individual and collective rights. Liberal political theorists have worried especially about this last question: how can the state turn over clusters of rights to cultural groups without relinquishing its central responsibility to protect the individual rights of each and every member of society? Doing battle with the orthodox liberals who believe only in individual rights, a group of theorists has emerged to defend the precepts of what they call 'multicultural citizenship', which is predicated on the idea that group rights and the central tenets of political liberalism can be compatible with one another. Will Kymlicka, for example, introduces a key distinction between 'external protections' and 'internal restrictions': the former offers a means to ensure equality for and prevent discrimination of the culturally oppressed within the liberal tradition, while the latter contravenes the fundamental liberal principle of individual freedom. Although useful and innovative in many respects, these theoretical interventions are incomplete, and the tip-off is their aura of omniscience. The theorists seem to write from a position within, or at least closely aligned with, the authority of the state itself. Who, for example, makes the fine distinctions that determine when an initiative is needed for 'external protection' of an oppressed group's cultural rights, and when that initiative has 'gone too far' into the realm of 'internal restrictions'? The answer, implicitly at least, is 'the state'. And yet, this notion of the state as impartial arbiter of the conflict between individual and group rights is deeply suspect, since in nearly every important question of cultural rights the state is also a key protagonist in that conflict. Feminist theorists have perhaps most effectively drawn attention to this contradiction, given the irony and incongruence of a patriarchal state intervening on behalf of individual women's rights in the face of the male-dominated prerogatives of the community. The same goes for the newfound interest in the (highly individualised) doctrine of human rights, for its potential to combat indigenous community empowerment."1 To express the concern even more generally, what if the state's prerogative to act on the distinction between individual and group rights actually helps to constitute that divide, and in so doing, to specify what it means for group rights to have 'gone too far'? The writings of Kymlicka and his cohort leave such questions not just unanswered, but largely unasked.
The questions deepen with the realisation that the shift to multiculturalism has occurred in the general context of neoliberal political and economic reforms, which are known to leave class-based societal inequities in place, if not exacerbated. Since the culturally oppressed, at least in the case of Latin America's indigenous people, also occupy the bottom rung of the class hierarchy in disproportionate numbers, they confront the paradox of simultaneous cultural affirmation and economic marginalisation. cornerstone of the revolution's historic agrarian reform (article 27)?11 Do both initiatives form part of a single, coherent package of policies? What is, to use the phrase in the epigraph to this section, the 'cultural project' of neoliberalism? While Assies and his co-authors frame this question nicely, their answer remains descriptive and under-theorised. A theoretically elaborated response, I suggest, will derive some insight from a Marxist analysis of resource distribution and productive relations, and some from Foucauldian approaches to 'governmentality' and subjectformation, while resting comfortably with neither. While I basically endorse the (highly pessimistic) composite picture that these two approaches yield, I hold out for a slightly more heartening view, justified in part theoretically, and partly in an admittedly utopian 'optimism of the will'.
Consider first the key contribution of materialist analysis in answering this question. Roger Rouse, for example, finds in the widespread endorsement of the language of identity and the rights of multiculturalism a cluster of bourgeois precepts, which express and advance the interests of capital.12 Concessions to multiculturalism therefore bring about (rather predictably) the fragmentation of society into multiple identity groups with few perceived common interests, and a decline of cross-cultural class solidarity and struggle, which had greater transformative potential.13 David Theo Goldberg avoids the (remarkably anachronistic) flaw of equating progressive social change with class struggle, and therefore makes a much more effective case for keeping questions of resource distribution and transformative politics centre stage. Simplifying slightly, Goldberg's general framework for critical analysis of multiculturalism boils down to a distinction between two variants of cultural rights: a standard liberal 'managed multiculturalism' (also called 'corporate' or 'difference' multiculturalism), which celebrates cultural pluralism but effects little lasting change for members of the culturally oppressed group versus a 'transformative' variant, centrally concerned with the 're- If the cultural project of neoliberalism, counter-intuitive as it may seem, involves the re-valuing and fortification of civil society and its 'intermediate groups', then powerful implications for cultural rights follow. In direct contrast to its classical antecedent, neoliberal doctrine is predicated not on destroying the indigenous community in order to remake the Indian as citizen, but rather, re-activating the community as effective agent in the reconstitution of the Indian citizen-subject. Theorists of neoliberal governmentality converge on the assertion, as Nikolas Rose puts it, that 'this new relation between community, identity and political subjectivity is exemplified in the debates over "multi-culturalism" or the rights of indigenous peoples', because the incongruities are so striking and close to the surface." State-aligned actors lament the loss of the very community that their predecessors worked fervently to destroy and they recognise ancestral cultures that seem to stand directly opposed to the individualist ethic they strive to uphold. The key to resolving this apparent paradox is that the state does not merely 'recognise' community, civil society, indigenous culture and the like, but actively re-constitutes them in its own image, sheering them of radical excesses, inciting them to do the work of subject-formation that otherwise would fall to the state itself. If, under classic liberalism, the quintessential agent of discipline is the Panoptic state penitentiary, under neoliberalism it is the professionalised NGO.
Yet this very assertion -provocative and useful as it may be -also Is there not a little more room for manoeuvre? Dean anticipates the critique: 'This is not to cancel out agency, but to seek to show how it is produced, how it is inserted in a system of purposes, and how it might overrun the limits established for it ... ' In general, he and other theorists of neoliberal governmentality pay scant attention to possibilities for 'overrunning the limits'; they emphasise 'subject-making', with a suspiciously seamless link between what powerful institutions need or want, and what they get. The approach I advocate here takes the best insights from both these strands of work, but adds a Gramscian inflection, focusing more on the elucidation of subaltern knowledge, and on the consequences that follow as subaltern peoples engage in collective political practice. I endorse Goldberg's distinction between managed and transformative multiculturalism, and the governmentality theorists' assertion that neoliberalism's s18 Dean, Governmentality. Power and Rule in Modern Society.
great innovation is to activate and reinforce organisations of civil society as primary vehicles of subject formation. Together, these two ideas drive home the central point: neoliberalism's cultural project is to harness and redirect the abundant political energy of cultural rights activism, rather than directly to oppose it. A principal means to achieve this re-direction is the strategic deployment of resources, which rewards organisations that promote acceptable cultural rights demands, and punishes the others.19 Yet at the same time, I argue for a more vigilant distinction between the cultural project of neoliberal multiculturalism, and the socio-political consequences that follow as this project is deployed. The principal means to exercise this vigilance is to turn ethnographic; to produce a finegrained account of political interactions, with particular attention to the consciousness and practice of those most directly involved in processes of 'subject-making' -a task taken up in the final section of this essay. A prior, more specifically theoretical step involves devoting attention to the conditions under which neoliberal multiculturalism might be effectively challenged.
The general analysis of what neoliberal multiculturalism is also points to the most effective means to confront its menace: social movements that simultaneously contest the relations of representation and the distribution of resources on which the neoliberal establishment rests. While challenges to each element alone may well have important effects, in isolation from one another they will tend not to be transformative."2 Maya cultural rights activism, for example, may invert dominant relations of representation, while remaining at the margins, resource starved, without the power to influence decisions taken by the state and powerful institutions. Similarly, Mayan communities host myriad development initiatives, which promise (and at times even deliver) improvements in community members' material well-being, yet at the same time reinforce a symbolic order that saps the energy for collective, autonomous Maya empowerment. Yet part of the larger purpose in this analysis is also to invite fresh, critical thinking about what the term 'transformative' might mean, in an era where 'struggle against structural inequity toward a radically distinct socio- economic order' (its previous meaning) seems both theoretically inadequate and politically remote. The best I can do is assert a minimal point of departure -understanding structural inequities as both systemic and plural; addressing the roots of these inequities, rather than their symptoms; finding points of articulation among struggles against various forms of inequity rather than assuming that a single political project could encompass them all. Admittedly, this stance generates more questions than answers. Adding to this complexity, in the present resolutely postrevolutionary era, cultural rights organisations are likely to occupy an exceedingly ambiguous space: attempting to exercise rights granted by the neoliberal state, while at the same time eluding the constraints and dictates of those very concessions. The Gramscian notion of articulation, in these cases, becomes the analytical watchword: will the subjugated knowledge and practices be articulated with the dominant, and neutralised? Or will they occupy the space opened from above while resisting its built in logic, connect with others, toward 'transformative' cultural-political alternatives that still cannot even be fully imagined? Especially on a terrain as volatile and dynamic as indigenous politics in Latin America, it would be imprudent to allow theory to run out ahead of grounded analysis in response to these questions. But I do want to offer an antidote to the romanticised tendency to assume that indigenous politics are (by nature?) counter-hegemonic. By emphasising multiculturalism's 'menace', I hope to sharpen strategic thinking about how best to elude neoliberalism's formidable power, especially for those who, by choice or necessity, find themselves waging the struggle from within.
III. How did neoliberal multiculturalism arise? (A reading from 'greater'
Central America) Mexico tiene muchos problemas pero tambidn muchos no problemas. Uno de ellos es el 6tnico. Se ha dicho que nuestro pais es racista. Quienes esto afirman deberian preguntarle qud es el racismo a un judio sobreviviente del nazismo, a los hudrfanos y viudas de Bosnia o a alguno del medio mill6n de negros que marcharon hasta el Capitolio en Washington. 'Asco fisico' Ilamaba Emilio Rabasa a ese prejuicio de las entrafias que dl conocia muy bien, no por sentirlo sino porque lo vio encarnado en su natal Chiapas, donde lleg6 a ser gobernador. La zona maya es la excepci6n principal (no la Uinica) que confirma una regla de la historia mexicana: el mestizaje fue una bendici6n. The role of mestiZaje -as metaphor to depict the future identity of the nation, as response to the dilemma between membership and legitimacy, as blueprint and rationale for state policy toward peoples who do not belong -illustrates this complexity well. As examined at length in Jeffrey Gould's study of Nicaragua, the 'myth of mestizaje' holds that indigenous culture is inevitably, almost naturally, destined to disappear, replaced by a hardy and unique hybrid national culture that draws sustenance from welfare legislation (including expanding access to health care, and most important, initiating a widespread agrarian reform), and brought public services minimally in line with the egalitarian principles of political liberalism (for example, legislating universal education through the third grade). While these and related steps delivered a blow to certain facets of the previous system of institutionalised racism, they came at a considerable price. The revolutionary government tended to empower Ladinos, especially at the local level, which left deeply seated inter-racial antagonisms in place, if not exacerbated.29 Moreover, since universalist reforms did not take these particular dynamics of cultural-racial difference into account, they came embedded, intentionally or otherwise, in a 'Ladino-centric' vision of social change. This newly conceived emphasis on national unity and integration drew directly -for the first time in project spelt 'rupture' and new beginning. With the benefit of hindsight, continuities reappear. However radical and far-reaching, revolutionary movements did not question universal precepts of citizenship rights as defined through the forging of a modern nation; their leaders tended to view cultural empowerment at best as troublesome detour along this (socialist) road to modernity. People would gain rights through active participation in the 'national-popular' bloc, whose great internal heterogeneity was ultimately subordinated to a higher, unitary political consciousness, which in turn formed the basis for a newly formed national identity. That the official discourse of mestiZaje comfortably served these precepts, highlights the continuity between Left and 'old regime' political visions: both posited a homogeneous political subject, imbued with the rights to citizenship, and charged with charting a course of societal development that would yield the fruits of modernity.31
The most perceptive and persuasive critique of the revolutionary narrative frame comes not from its 'Cold War' adversaries, but from those who participated in the revolutionary movements and then increasingly voiced criticism from within. The principal indigenous organisation in Nicaragua broke early on with the Sandinistas, with the unusual added impetus of encouragement and material aid from the United States, but motivated also by two basic objections: to an authoritarian mode of governance, and to the lack of receptivity to indigenous and black demands for cultural rights. In Guatemala, massive indigenous participation in the revolutionary movement also increasingly gave way to disillusionment, critique and defection, focused on these same two problems. More than merely a historical irony, the fact that many leaders of these indigenous organisations came of age politically through participation with the left is crucial to understanding their subsequent paths and positions. On the one hand, among many, the best of this political formation left its mark: an orientation toward strategic and 'big picture' political analysis, an emphasis on alliances across cultural-political divides, an insistence that material demands of the majority remain centre The department of Chimaltenango, located at the southern edge of the western highlands, is a region undergoing rapid economic and sociocultural change. Strategically positioned near Guatemala's capital city and well-endowed with rich agricultural land, Chimaltenango has been at the forefront of 'modernising' development based on 'non-traditional' economic activities such as vegetable exports, and maquiladora (free trade zone) clothing assembly. These activities, though controlled by EuroGuatemalan and foreign capitalists, have provided limited opportunities for indigenous upward mobility, as has Chimaltenango's rapid growth as a commercial and service centre for the highlands. These same conditions have turned Chimaltenango's capital city into a major centre for indigenous NGOs, which work on the range of issues (health, language, communications, community development, spiritual revival) that make up the agenda of Maya cultural activism. In addition to commercial establishments and NGOs, many Mayas now hold jobs in the educational, local governmental, services and professional sectors. Whereas a generation ago middle-class Ladinos grew up in an insular world, within a highly racialised socio-economic hierarchy, today they share most of these spaces of middle-class privilege with at least a few indigenous counter-parts. They face, on an almost daily basis, the challenge that this new Maya presence brings forth, in a material sense (competition for jobs and institutional power), and even more important, challenge to the symbolic order that relegated Indians to a separate and inferior place.
In the brief account that follows, I focus on cultural politics in one of Chimaltenango's i6 municipios (townships), which will go by the name Esta discriminaci6n se fue eliminando, poco a poco, a raiz de la preparaci6n acadimica. Ahora, las cosas se han cambiado. Yo digo, no critiquemos al ladino. Todo estai libre, hay oportunidad, uno puede tener carro, ir a la universidad. Ahora, con educaci6n, tenemos como. Antes, las condiciones hicieron a uno sentir mal por ser indigena. Ahora ya no. Yo sigo indentificando como indigena, pero ahora, mi filosoffa es otra: buscar manera de superar la diferencia, no pensar en lo indigena-ladino, sino en la conciencia del trabajo.
He concluded the interview warning me that one has to be very careful with 'nuestra gente', because:
... se meten en cosas sin preparaci6n suficiente. Ahora la cosa es derechos humanos.
[Pero] todo debe tener sus limitaciones. Si no, crea mis problemas. Por ejemplo, cuando los Mayas dicen: 'aquel es ladino, yo soy Maya.' Es otra vez caer en lo mismo del 'indio'. Es como un racismo. Mejor no hablar de esas cosas, sino demostrar tus principios con los hechos.
Puac's stance fits neatly both with the PAN's generalised discourse of neoliberal multiculturalism, and with local Ladinos' response to Maya cultural activism in Tomales.52 Puac has a strong self-identification as Indian, and takes a principled stand against 'racism', past and present. His understanding of racism focuses largely on individual acts of denigration, intolerance, discriminatory treatment and denial of opportunity, which informs his contention that racism is on the rapid decline, replaced by a roughly equal opportunity for all those who apply themselves, and have the capacity to get ahead. Consequently, he sees no reasons for Indians to organise themselves collectively as Mayas; the point is, rather, to broaden the opportunities for all, to strike down barriers to equal opportunity Theoretically, it should be possible to occupy these spaces, and gradually re-articulate them with the more expansive notion of multicultural rights via Maya empowerment. Yet without a carefully developed strategy toward this end, the results are rather: to reinforce the perceived viability and legitimacy of the path of neoliberal multiculturalism, exemplified by Chimaltenango's indigenous mayors of the PAN. It is not that these mayors are nefarious or ineffective (quite to the contrary), but rather, that they demonstrate how advances in the name of multiculturalism can carry pre-inscribed limits: identity as product of individual choice rather than collective mobilisation; anti-racism as opposition to individual acts of discrimination rather than struggle against structural inequity; work to value Maya culture as the encouragement of self-esteem and self-help rather than collective empowerment. They also demonstrate how difficult the path to some form of 're-articulation' can turn out to be. The price of Puac's ascent to power appears to be a repudiation of key components of the Maya cultural rights agenda, which most independent Maya cultural activists espouse. Yet Puac does not, in any sense, echo Don Filiberto's eerie phrase ('no soy un indio mris, sino mads que un indio'); Puac remains strongly Indian-identified, and for that reason, much more capable of working concertedly to bring other indigenas into line.
V. Conclusions
The overarching argument of this article is a call for a critical review of our assumptions about the relationship between neoliberalism and dominant bloc-endorsed multiculturalism. Support for limited versions of multicultural rights on the part of powerful neoliberal institutions is not the exception, but the rule; in some cases the programmes they fund even go further. To be sure, these advances in the recognition of indigenous rights form part of the wave of democratisation that has accompanied neoliberal reforms since the 1980s; in part, also, they derive from the unintended consequences of neoliberal reform. Moreover, mobilisation from below of indigenous peoples and their allies must figure as a central factor in any explanation for the shift. Yet multicultural reforms, by their very nature, are not focused primarily on the rectification of past injustice through established citizenship rights; rather, they involve affirming new 522zz Charles R. Hale rights and implementing a new (and presumably more just) relationship between historically oppressed groups and the rest of society. This, in turn, gives rise to a great need for carefully contextualised analysis of what neoliberal multiculturalism does, as a means to understand more fully why these reforms have been endorsed (if not initiated) so widely from above. Most analysis that shares the critical perspective put forth here tends to ignore or understate the potential for negotiation around the concessions of neoliberal multiculturalism, and ends up endorsing a politics of outright refusal.55 In some cases, refusal is conceived as coming from a cultural-political space outside the neoliberal ruling and productive apparatus; in a more sophisticated and provocative variant, Hardt and Negri have recently argued that there is no 'outside', because the apparatus has become an all-encompassing 'empire'. Yet even in this variant, resistance is still conceived in fairly absolutist terms: to 'be against in every place', to find bodies 'completely incapable of submitting to command'." Another category of work on this topic suffers from the converse problem: an overly sanguine view of the potential for struggle from within. Proponents of this position often assume that if indigenous people gain any sort of ground within the neoliberal establishment, 'subaltern' interests in general will be served. Influenced by either essentialism or political myopia, or both, this analysis ends up selling short the very struggles it purports to defend. In contrast to both these, I argue that cultural rights movements have little choice but to occupy the spaces opened by neoliberal multiculturalism, and that they often have much to gain by doing so; but when they do, that we should assume they will be articulated with the dominant bloc, unless this decision forms part of a well-developed strategy oriented toward resistance from within, and ultimately, toward a well-conceived political alternative.
I have offered one specific example of how Maya cultural rights have become articulated with neoliberal political sensibilities, which should 55 An especially compelling version of this position can be found in an essay by Slavoj Zizek, provocatively titled 'Multiculturalism, or, the Cultural Logic of Multinational Capitalism,' in New Left Review, no. 225 (i997), pp. 28-5I. In an argument too complex to reproduce here, Zizek contends that multiculturalism is the ideal expression of the universal ethic of multinational capitalism, predicated on the destruction of precisely that which it purports to defend. Whatever one might think about his analysis (I find it highly suggestive but a little too abstract and driven by unobservable psychological processes), its ultimate political message -frontal struggle against the neoliberal juggernaut -is not terribly useful. While advancing this critique, I do not equate the need for 'rearticulation' with an unqualified endorsement of the Maya 'radicals'. My principal point, rather, is that the dichotomy itself is a menacing construct, a deployment of power and knowledge with debilitating effects in the struggle for racial and economic justice in Guatemala. In this sense, the critique is meant to help clear the way for envisioning a politics of Mayan collective empowerment. The possibility remains that such a politics could be pursued in a manner that accentuates internal hierarchies and authoritarian practices, or that excludes Ladinos who might otherwise be allies. Marta Casadis Arzdi has associated these concerns with the term 'nacion itnica' -echoing Paul Gilroy's critique of 'ethnic absolutism' -contrasted with a 'naci6n polfitica', which is broadly inclusive, egalitarian, and respectful of cultural difference.57 I am sympathetic to this formulation, though hesitant, precisely because of its resonance with the moderate-radical dichotomy. I worry that outright abandonment of the 57 See Marta Elena Casatis Arzti, 'El Estado, la naci6n y la identidad,' in Rachel Sieder Such a prospect, admittedly, sounds vague and utopian. Perhaps that is appropriate to the present moment in Central America. One of the most powerful forces behind the advance of neoliberalism is the absence of utopian language to talk about, inspire, and imagine political alternatives. Yet if such a language is to emerge, its object may initially have to remain ill-defined. For example, throughout this essay I have used phrases like 'collective empowerment' and 'transformative potential', but without answering the essential question, 'towards what'? I doubt anyone has a convincing answer to that broader question. To engage in progressive politics in Central America today -perhaps more than any other moment in the last century -is to travel uncharted territory, with maps from a past era that must be consulted, but often end up being more a hindrance than a guide. 
